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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
RENNOLD PENDER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
S. W. DOWSE and PEARL DOWSE,
Ms wife, JAY E. TREAD WAY and
MARION MAVE TREADWAY,
his wife, and A. C. WHITTAKER,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.
7949

BRIEF OF APPELLANT, S. W. DOWSE

PRELIMINARY EXPLANATION
Counsel for Appellant S. W. Dowse (hereinafter
designated Dowse) sought to adopt the statement of facts
contained in the brief of Appellant A. C. Whittaker heretofore filed in this Court and cause. The Whittaker brief,
however, treats of only one facet of this litigation and for
this reason counsel for Dowse find it necessary to make
a more elaborate statement of the facts in order to present their client's cause in an adequate manner. This
1
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apology is made because counsel realize the necessity
of conserving the time and energies of the Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Dowse appeals from a judgment of the District
Court of the Third Judicial District of the State of Utah
in and for Salt Lake County made, entered and filed on
November 22, 1952, in favor of Plaintiff and Respondent
Pender and against Defendant and Appellant Dowse and
other defendants. By this judgment the title in the Plaintiff and Respondent Pender was quieted as to certain real
property hereinafter described; a certain Sheriff's Certificate of Sale and a certain Sheriff's Deed hereinafter
described, were vacated and declared of no force and
effect; a mortgage executed by Dowse and his wife in
favor of Appellant A. C. Whittaker was nullified and a
warranty deed executed by Dowse and his wife to J. E.
Treadway and Marion Mave Treadway, his wife, was
also nullified. By this judgment the Respondent Pender
was also awarded the sum of $754.08, net balance of rentals, the sum of $500.00 for punitive and exemplary damages, the sum of $1,000.00 attorney's fees and costs with
6% interest from the date of judgment (R. 249-250).
Plaintiff's amended complaint seeks to quiet title in
Plaintiff and Respondent to certain real property hereinafter described situate in Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, and also attempts to allege facts upon which a
claim of slander of title is based (R. 24-29). Dowse in
his answer denied generally and specifically the allegations of the amended complaint (R. 30-31).
2
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The present litigation is a sequence of a certain action commenced and prosecuted in the aforesaid District
Court by Dowse, then in the role of plaintiff, against the
present plaintiff and respondent Pender then in the role
of defendant. This action bore number 86,895 (Exhibit
1). Said action resulted in a judgment dated November
4, 1949, in favor of Dowse against Pender which, among
other things, awarded Dowse his costs in said action (Exhibit A). Copy of this judgment and decree was duly
served upon the attorney for Pender on November 4,
1949 (R. 89-90). Thereafter counsel for Dowse served
upon Pender's attorney the bill of costs (R. 90-91-180).
These costs amounted to the sum of $22.80 (R. 25). No
motion to retax costs was filed and, accordingly, judgment for this amount was duly docketed in favor of
Dowse against Pender (Exhibit I; R. 91, 96, 97).
On January 4,1950, Dowse caused execution to issue
on the judgment in his favor and against Pender (Exhibits 10 and H) directed to the sheriff of Salt Lake
County commanding him to collect the aforesaid judgment and costs together with the costs of execution.
Based on this execution the said sheriff, on February 7,
1950, levied on the following described real property situate in Salt Lake County, State of Utah:
Lots 2, 3, 6 and 7, Block 4, North Columbia Subdivision; Lots 1, 19 and 20, Block 6, North Columbia Sub-division; Lots 2, 3, 4, 13 to 21, inclusive, Block 8, North Columbia Subdivision.
This levy was made in the manner required by law (Exhibit H, K 142-143).

3
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After the sheriff had given notice of the time and
place of sale (E. 142, 143, 144, 182, 183,184) as required
by law, public sale of the real property upon which levy
was made was held at the west front door of the City and
County Building in Salt Lake City, Utah (B. 184) on
March 14, 1950, at 12:00 o'clock noon (Ex. I). Deputy
Sheriff Bleak conducted said sale. Present thereat in
addition to Deputy Sheriff Bleak was Dowse and his
attorney, Mr. LaMar Duncan. Neither Plaintiff and Eespondent Pender nor his attorney were present (E. 139).
At said offering Dowse bid the sum of $47.46 which was
the highest and only bid made. Constituting this bid was
the original sum of $22.80, representing the judgment
in favor of Dowse with interest, costs and sheriff's fees.
On March 15, 1950, the Sheriff of Salt Lake County issued to Dowse his Certificate of Sale (Exhibit I) which
describes the real property hereinabove described. This
certificate was recorded in the Office of the County Becorder of Salt Lake County, Utah, on March 23, 1950,
in Book 750, page 544, Eecords of said County.
No redemption was made from said sale and on September 16, 1950, after the full period of six months allowed for redemption had expired the Sheriff of Salt
Lake County issued his deed conveying the above described real property to Dowse (Exhibit K). Said deed
was duly recorded by Dowse in the office of the County
Becorder of Salt Lake County, Utah, on September 16,
1950, in Book 798, page 499, Eecords of said County.
Subsequent to the issuance and recordation of said
Sheriff's Deed, to-wit, on October 19, 1950, Dowse and
4
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wife conveyed Lots 2 and 3, Block 4, North Columbia
Sub-division to the defendants and appellants Treadway
(Exhibit 6 and M). The deed of conveyance was recorded
in the Office of The County Recorder of Salt Lake
County, on October 20, 1950, in Book 808, page 617 Records of said County. The legal position of the Treadways in this case will be presented by their counsel in a
separate brief and no attempt will be made by counsel
for Dowse to discuss this aspect of the case.
On October 27, 1950, Dowse and wife borrowed the
sum of $5,000.00 from the Defendant and Appellant Whittaker and to secure the repayment thereof executed and
delivered unto Whittaker their certain mortgage bearing
said date covering Lots 2, 3 and 4, Block 8, North Columbia Subdivision (Exhibit L). This mortgage was recorded October 31, 1950, in the Office of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah, in Book 811, page
528 Records of said County. Whittaker, through his
counsel, has filed his brief in this Court elucidating his
legal position in this litigation. Counsel for Dowse commend this brief for earnest consideration by the Court
and will not attempt to enter upon this area of the case.
It appears clearly from the evidence that the real
property involved in this action consists of lots within the
North Columbia Subdivision (Exhibit G). Lots 2 and 3
of Block 4 are contiguous. They are separated from Lots
6 and 7, Block 4 by intervening Lots 4 and 5 not involved
in this case. These four lots are situate at the northeast
intersection of Paxton Avenue and West Temple Street
in Salt Lake City. Lots 1, 19 and 20, Block 6, and Lots
5
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13 to 21, Block 8, are situate on Richards Street and
represent one composite area. Lots 2, 3 and 4, Block 8,
are adjacent and are situate at the northeast corner of
the intersection of 13th South and West Temple Streets
in Salt Lake City (Exhibits C, D, E, F, G, 4).
According to Deputy Sheriff Bleak all of the real
property was offered for sale at the public vendue as a
whole (R. 139) and there was no request made to offer
any of the property separately (R. 139, 140). Also, according to Bleak separate notices of sale, four in all,
were posted on each non-contiguous group of Lots (R.
144). As opposed to Bleak's testimony Mr. LaMar Duncan, attorney for Dowse, in action 86,985, testified that
Bleak offered for sale Lots 2, 3, 6 and 7, Block 4, as a
separate unit; Lots 1, 19 and 20, Block 6, as a separate
unit, and Lots 2, 3, 4, 13 to 21, Block 8, as a separate
group (R. 184, 185). There (sic) were not offered each
separate lot but the bid was in three parcels (R. 185).
It appears that at the time the deputy sheriff made
his levy there was delivered to him by Duncan, as attorney for Dowse, a praecipe dated January 31, 1950 (Exhibit X) wherein the sheriff was requested to levy and
sell Lots 2, 3, 6 and 7, Block 4, Lots 1, 19 and 20, Block
6, Lots 2, 3, 4, 13 to 21 inclusive, Block 8, "all of which
real property stands in the name of Rennold Pender upon
the records of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County"
(Exhibit X).
On November 13, 1952, the plaintiff proposed the
form of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judg6
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ment (B. 251). On November 14,1952, Dowse served and
filed his Objection to the Proposed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Judgment (R. 236-238). The
Court overruled and denied the Objections and signed and
filed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment on November 22, 1952 (R. 239-250). On November
26, 1952, Dowse served and filed his Motion for a New
Trial (R. 253). This motion was denied on December
20, 1952, (R. 253A). On December 22, 1952, after due
notice, the Court permitted plaintiff to amend his Amended Complaint by adding certain allegations thereto in
order to conform to proof (R. 259). Dowse filed his Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court on January 19,
1953 (R. 267) and on the same date filed with the Clerk
of the District Court his Designation of Record on Appeal
(R. 265-266). On January 28, 1953, Dowse filed with the
Clerk of the Court his Undertaking on Appeal (R. 269270). The Record on Appeal was filed with the Clerk of
the Supreme Court on January 30,1953.
PRETRIAL ORDER
On June 13, 1951, a pretrial of this action was held
before the Honorable A. H. Ellett, a Judge of the above
entitled Court. A pretrial order was made, entered and
filed by him on June 22,1951 (R. 32-35) which was never
amended or changed. All pleadings were merged into
the order (R. 35). By this Order counsel agreed upon
certain facts. (The facts pertaining to the Whittaker
mortgage and the conveyance of property to the Tread7
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ways are specifically excluded from this recital.) The
facts agreed upon were:
"1. That there was a case filed between S.
W. Dowse as plaintiff and Eennold Pender, defendant, on August 25, 1949, being case No.
86895; that the matter was tried on November 3,
1949, before the Honorable Koald A. Hogenson;
that on said day the court announced that he would
give judgment to the plaintiff, S. W. Dowse, quieting title to the property involved in the lawsuit,
and would give judgment in favor of the defendant
for no cause of action insofar as that suit related
to a slander of title.
"2. That on November 4, 1949, Milton V.
Backman, attorney for defendant, Kennnold Pender, received copies of findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a decree in case 86895 and that
in said decree paragraph 4 stated that plaintiff
should have and recover his costs herein; that on
November 9, 1949, a cost bill in the amount of
$22.80 was served upon Harland W. Clark of the
firm of Backman, Backman& Clark, the attorneys
for the defendant.
"3. That no motion to retax costs was ever
made nor was an appeal from the judgment ever
taken.
"4. That thereafter and on the 4th day of
January, 1950, an execution was issued and placed
in the hands of the sheriff of Salt Lake County,
and that at said time a praecipe was issued by
attorney for S. W. Dowse, plaintiff, in said matter, wherein the sheriff of Salt Lake County was
directed to sell the interests of the defendant,
Eennold Pender, in and to the real property described in paragraph 1 of plaintiff's amended complaint herein.
8
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"5. That S. W. Dowse agreed to pay Rennold Pender the sum of $100.00, which sum was
paid to the defendant, Rennold Pender, on or
about the 29th day of November, 1949, and that
the defendant, Rennold Pender, agreed to give to
S. W. Dowse a quitclaim deed to the property involved in the lawsuit in case No. 86895 filed in
this court; and that the deed covering said property was delivered to S. W. Dowse on or about
the 29th day of November, 1949, and was recorded
on said date.
"6. That the purpose of making the agreement whereby Dowse was to pay Pender $100.00
and Pender was to sign a quitclaim deed was to enable Dowse to complete a pending sale which
he then had.
"7. That the real property described in
paragraph 1 of plaintiff's amended complaint consists of three non-contiguous parcels of land and
was described as consisting of nineteen separate
lots.
"8. That while Rennold Pender claims in
this action that the sale was made as one parcel,
counsel are agreed that the sale was made in not
more than three parcels.
"9. That S. W. Dowse did not direct the
sheriff to sell any personal property and that the
sheriff sold no personal property in satisfying the
judgment under the execution placed in his hands.
"10. That S. W. Dowse bid the property described in paragraph 1 of plaintiff's amended complaint in for the sum of $47.46, being the principal
costs of $22.80, $.50 for execution, $.63 interest
to sale date, $23.53 sheriff costs, making a total
amount of $47.46, and that no other property was
sold by the sheriff." (R. 32, 33, 34).
9
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The Court defined the issues of fact to be tried as
follows:
"1. Did the sheriff offer the property which
was sold pursuant to execution as one parcel?
"2. What was the value on March 14, 1950,
of the various parcels of land described in plaintiff's complaint and sold by the sheriff under the
execution in case No. 86895?
"3. Was there personalty belonging to Eennold Pender at the time of the execution sale which
was available for the satisfaction of the judgment
which S. W. Dowse held against him?
"4. Did S. W. Dowse agree to satisfy the
judgment in connection with the transaction
wherein he paid $100.00 to Eennold Pender and
received a quitclaim deed from Pender?
"5. Did Eennold Pender agree to forego an
appeal in case 86895 in connection with the transaction mentioned in paragraph 4 above?
"6. * * *
"7.
"8.

#

#

#

*
*

«Q

#

#

#

*

"10. Did S. W. Dowse act maliciously in directing the sheriff to sell the real property under
the execution herein and if he did, what would be
the amount of punitive damages to assess against
S. W. Dowse in case Eennold Pender prevails in
this lawsuit?
"11. What has been the reasonable rental
value since the 14th day of March, 1950, of the
real property sold at sheriff's sale under the execution in case No. 86895 ?
10
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"12. Did S. "W. Dowse slander the title of the
realty described in paragraph 1 of plaintiff's
amended complaint by causing the same to be sold
at sheriff's sale and to be mortgaged and sold
to the other defendants in this action?
"13. Did Rennold Pender have actual notice
that a sale of the real property described in paragraph 1 of his amended complaint was to be made
upon execution?" (R. 34,35).
The order fixed the issues of law as follows:
"1. Was the sheriff's sale under execution
void by reason of not offering the real property
by separate lots?
"2. Can the plaintiff, Rennold Pender, in
this proceeding attack the judgment for $22.80
given in case 86895?" (R. 35).
STATEMENT OF POINTS AND ARGUMENT
I
WHETHER A JUDGMENT DEBTOR AGAINST
WHOM IS DOCKETED AN UNPAID MONEY JUDGMENT
MAY BY AN INDEPENDENT COLLATERAL ACTION
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT CREDITOR SECURE
RELIEF FROM A SHERIFF'S SALE AFTER THE
ISSUANCE BY THE SHERIFF OF HIS DEED OF CONVEYANCE TO THE JUDGMENT CREDITOR, WHO WAS
THE PURCHASER AT SAID SALE OF THE JUDGMENT
DEBTOR'S REAL PROPERTY WHICH WAS LEVIED
ON PURSUANT TO A VALID WRIT OF EXECUTION
ISSUED ON SAID JUDGMENT ON THE GROUNDS (A)
OF IRREGULARITIES IN CONDUCT OF SALE; (B) OF
INADEQUACY OF CONSIDERATION OR BID PRICE;
(C) THAT THE SALE OF REAL ESTATE WAS EN
MASSE INSTEAD OF IN SEPARATE PARCELS; (D)
11
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THAT THE JUDGMENT WAS NOT SATISFIED FROM
AVAILABLE PERSONAL PROPERTY OF THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR BEFORE RESORTING TO HIS REAL
PROPERTY; AND (E) THAT THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR
HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE LEVY AND SHERIFFS
SALE OF HIS REAL PROPERTY?
The provisions of Eule 69 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are pertinent in determining the correct answer
to the question here propounded. For convenience of
the Court the following excerpts from the Rules of Civil
Procedure are here inserted.
"The writ of execution must be issued in the
name of the State of Utah, sealed with the seal
of the Court and subscribed by the clerk. * * *
It must intelligbly refer to the judgment stating
the court, the county where the same is entered
or docketed, the names of the parties, the judgment, and, if it is for money the amount thereof
and the amount actually due thereon. It shall be
directed to the sheriff of the county in which it is
to be executed and shall require the officer to
proceed in accordance with the terms of the
writ; provided that if such writ is against the
property of the judgment debtor generally it shall
direct the officer to satisfy the judgment with
interest out of the personal property of the debtor
and if sufficient personal property cannot be
found then out of his real property. * * *" (Rule
69 (b)).
"Unless the execution otherwise directs the
officer must execute the writ against the property
of the judgment debtor by levying on sufficient
amount of property if there is sufficient, # * *.
When there is more property of the judgment
debtor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment
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and accruing costs within view of the officer, he
must levy only on such part of the property as the
judgment debtor may indicate, if the property
indicated is amply sufficient to satisfy the judgment and costs. * * *" (Eule 69 (d)).
"(1) Notice. Before the sale of the property on execution notice thereof must be given as
follows: * * * (3) In case of real property, by
posting a similar notice, particularly describing
the property, for 21 days, on the property to be
sold, at the place of sale, and also in at least 3
public places of the precinct or city where the
property to be sold is situated, and publishing a
copy thereof at least 3 times, once a week for 3
successive weeks immediately preceding the sale,
in some newspaper published in the county, if
there is one." (Eule 69 (e) (1)).
" (3) Conduct of Sale. All sales of property
under execution must be made at auction to the
highest bidder, between the hours of 9 o'clock
a.m. and 5 o'clock p.m. After sufficient property
has been sold to satisfy the execution no more
shall be sold. Neither the officer holding the execution nor his deputy shall become a purchaser, or
be interested in any purchase at such sale. When
the sale is of personal property capable of manual
delivery it must be within view of those who
attend the sale, and it must be sold in such
parcels as are likely to bring the highest price;
and when the sale is of real property, consisting
of several known lots or parcels, they must be
sold separately; or when a portion of such real
property is claimed by a third person, and he
requires it to be sold separately, such portion
must be thus sold. All sales of real property must
be made at the courthouse of the county in which
the property, or some part thereof, is situated.
13
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The judgment debtor, if present at the sale, may
also direct the order in which the property, real
or personal, shall be sold, when such property
consists of several known lots or parcels, or of
articles which can be sold to advantage separately, and the officer must follow such directions."
(Rule 69 (e) (3)).
"(6) Real Property. Upon a sale of real
property the officer shall give to the purchaser
a certificate of sale, containing: (1) a particular
description of the real property sold; (2) the
price paid by him for each lot or parcel if sold
separately; (3) the whole price paid; (4) a statement to the effect that all right, title, interest and
claim of the judgment debtor in and to the property is conveyed to the purchaser; provided that
where such sale is subject to redemption that
fact shall be stated also. A duplicate of such
certificate shall be filed for record by the officer
in the office of the recorder of the county. The
real property sold shall be subject to redemption,
except where the estate sold is less than a leasehold of a two-years' unexpired term, in which
event said sale is absolute." (Rule 69 (e) (6)).
"(3) Time for Redemption, Amount to be
Paid. The property may be redeemed from the
purchaser within six months after the sale on
paying the amount of his purchase with 6 per
cent thereon in addition, together with the amount
of any assessment or taxes, and any reasonable
sum for fire insurance and necessary maintenance,
upkeep, or repair of any improvements upon the
property which the purchaser may have paid
thereon after the purchase, with interest on such
amounts, and, if the purchaser is also a creditor
having a lien prior to that of the person seeking
redemption, other than the judgment under which
14
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said purchase was made, the amount of such
lien, with interest" (Rule 69 (f) (3)).
"If no redemption is made within six months
after the sale, the purchaser or his assignee is
entitled to a conveyance; * * * If the debtor
redeems, the effect of the sale is terminated and
he is restored to his estate. * * *" (Rule 69 (f)
(5)).
The judgment against Pender in the amount of
$22.80 in action No. 86895 stands as a valid judgment.
The issuance of the writ of execution on said judgment
at the behest of the judgment creditor Dowse was in
all respects free from legal defects. Under question is
the method of the sheriff in conducting the execution
sale. If there were irregularities in such sale Pender
had a quick and easy method of bringing such irregularities to the attention of the Court. A motion by
him to set aside the sale and recall the sheriff's certificate
of sale made at any time during the period of redemption
would have afforded him complete relief. This is the
usual and ordinary remedy available to a judgment
debtor who believes that an execution sale has been
unfairly or illegally conducted by the sheriff. Pender
did not avail himself of this remedy but waited until
one and a half months had expired after the sheriff's
deed had issued to commence the present action. He is,
therefore, collaterally attacking the execution sale in
the present litigation with resultant limitations upon
such course of action. Review of pertinent authorities
will quickly show that he is narrowly confined in his
present attack and that many of the grounds upon which
he alleges the sale to be void cannot be raised in the
15
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present action even though they might have been the
basis for setting aside the sale had he availed himself
of a direct attack upon it through a motion to set it
aside.
"The general rule is that if there is any
ground for relief against an execution, such relief
must be sought in the original cause, and not by a
new and independent proceeding. This rule is
upheld of course, not merely in regard to original
writs of execution, but also in regard to alias and
pluries writs of execution. The rule prevails
where the collateral attack is sought to be made
because of a clerical error or because of an irregularity committed by the execution officer, such
as a sale made in violation of a stay of execution,
or after a defective appraisement, or without
any appraisement, or, in general, because of defects or irregularities in connection with the
execution which do not render it void, particularly
where no one sustains an injury thereby and
where the sale has been confirmed. There are,
however, some cases in which a confirmation of
the sale is held not to preclude a collateral attack
thereon. The collateral attack may be made where
the execution is void, and the same remedy is
available in certain cases of fraud. These general
rules are applicable to execution deeds which
may not be impeached collaterally for mere irregularity, although the defendant in execution may
deny the validity of such a deed if made to one
who was not the purchaser, but a stranger to the
proceedings." (21 Am. Jur. Executions, Sec. 519,
pp. 258-259).
Pender attacks the execution sale on the theory
that it was void because (a) of irregularities in conduct
16
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of sale; (b) of inadequacy of consideration or bid price;
(c) that the sale of real estate was en masse instead of
in separate parcels; (d) that there was available personal property of sufficient value and amount to satisfy
the judgment with interest and costs without resorting
to his real property; (e) that he had no knowledge of
the levy and sheriff's sale of his real property, and (f)
that Dowse was guilty of fraud.
The present discussion will be directed to points (a),
(b), (c), (d) and (e).
There are four cases decided by the Utah Supreme
Court which are of particular interest in determining
the validity of the sheriff's sale under points here involved. The first is Dickert v. Weise, 2 Ut. 350; 40 Pac.
States Reports, 350. This was a mortgage foreclosure
proceeding wherein it was contended that the foreclosure
sale was void because the property was not sold separately but sold en masse. The attack was a direct attack
on appeal from the judgment and from an order overruling the motion to set aside the sale. It was, therefore,
unlike the present collateral action. The Court wrote:
"But it urged that the sale was not properly
conducted; that the property was not sold separately as required by statute, but was all sold
together, and that the sale should, therefore, be
set aside.
i
"The statute requires that when real estate
is to be sold on execution, and is composed of
several known lots, they shall be sold separately.
In this case the parcels of property were offered
separately by the officer, but there were no bid17
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ders. Thereupon the officer offered all of the
property together, and it brought the whole
amount of the judgment and costs. The object
of the statute, no doubt, was to have the property
sell for the highest possible price, and this view
of the statute is borne out by the language of the
section itself. C.L., Sec. 1448.
"The object of the law was secured, and the
action of the court below in overruling the motion
to set aside the sale was proper."
The second case is National Realty Sales Co. v.
Ewmg, 55 Ut. 438; 186 Pac. 1103. The action was a collateral attack by way of an action to quiet title against
a purchaser of land on execution sale by the judgment
debtor's grantee. It was contended that the levy and
sale were excessive and irregular for the reason that the
real property sold consisted of several distinct parcels
of land of much greater value than the amount of the
judgment under which it was sold and that the said
lands were all sold as one parcel. The judgment upon
which the sale was held was for $154.00, interest and
costs. Pursuant to a writ of execution the sheriff sold
the property to the judgment creditor for the amount
of the judgment and issued a certificate of sale. After
the period of redemption expired sheriff's deed was
issued to the purchaser and within a year the property
was sold by him for $1,600.00. The new owner placed a
mortgage thereon for $2,000.00. As to the inadequacy
of consideration the Supreme Court ruled :
"It does seem that the property now under
consideration was sold under the execution for
an inadequate price. However, mere inadequacy
18
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of price was not sufficient to invalidate the sale
when the proceedings were fair and regular and
there is nothing in the record to suggest fraud or
concealment."
With respect to the claim that the land was composed of more than one parcel, the Court commented:
"Under our statute, Comp. Laws Utah, 1917,
Sec. 6934, with respect to execution sales, Henry
S. Tanner or the plaintiff, could have directed
the sale of the property to have been made in parcels, if he so desired. The land was, as the testimony shows, but one parcel within the meaning of
the law. Moreover, the plaintiff could have then
asserted its claim of ownership, which it did not
do."
In Chausse v. Bank of Garland, 71 Ut. 586, 268 Pac.
781-783, the Court said:
"The allegations of the complaint concerning
the disproportionate bids of the defendant bar^k
for the several tracts of real estate at the last
foreclosure sale present no independent grounds
for legal redress. Judicial sales, otherwise regular, may not be impeached for disproportionate
or inadequate prices. The right of the complaining party to bid higher, or, as in this case, to
redeem any one of the tracts sold, is the protection
which the law affords from the matters complained of. The hardship resulting to the plaintiff
in the present case arose out of the failure of
the bank to make higher bids for tracts 1 and 2
of the real estate sold. The amount a prospective
purchaser shall bid at such sales cannot be regulated by law. There being no irregularity or
wrongful or unlawful act alleged in the proceed19
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ings it follows that the complaint failed to state
a cause of action."
Adams v. Pratt, District Judge, et al., 87 Utah 80;
48 Pac. (2d) 444? is the fourth case of concern. It was
an original proceeding in the Supreme Court for a writ
of prohibition against Judge Eugene E. Pratt when he
sat as a judge of the Second Judicial District Court in
and for Davis County. There had been a prior mortgage
foreclosure action by Barnes Banking Company against
the petitioner Adams. Judgment had been entered in
favor of the Bank and the mortgaged property ordered
sold to satisfy the judgment. The property was bid in
as one parcel by the Banking Company. No redemption
was made from the sale and sheriff's deed issued to the
Bank. Thereafter the Bank applied for a writ of assistance to place it in possession of the mortgaged premises.
At that point Adams moved the District Court for an
order to vacate and set aside the writ on the grounds
that he had filed a petition in the United States District
Court of Utah for debtor's relief and as a consequence
the Federal Court had exclusive jurisdiction of the
property. The State District Court first stayed the writ
and then refused further stay. At this point in the
litigation Adams filed a suit against the Barnes Banking Company wherein he sought to have the sale of the
mortgaged property set aside because the same was sold
in one parcel. This action was not prosecuted to conclusion. The Federal District Court by order in the
debtor's relief proceedings permitted the Banking Company to pursue its remedies in the District Court of
20
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Davis County and authorized the latter Court to adjudicate the controversy between the parties. Following the
action of the Federal Court, Adams instituted the proceedings for the writ of prohibition against Judge Pratt.
As to the point raised by Adams that the mortgage foreclosure sale was void because the property was sold en
masse the Court said:
"Nor do the authorities support plaintiff's
contention that the sale of the property in the
mortgage foreclosure suit en masse is void. On
the contrary, this court has held that it is proper
in the mortgage foreclosure suit to sell the property en masse if bids for the separate lots or parcels
cannot be had. Dickert v. Weise, 2 Utah, 350.
The cases are generally to the effect that a sale
of property en masse, even where it should be
sold separately, is not such an irregularity as
renders the sale void. * * * For stronger reasons
it may not be said that the court below was without jurisdiction to issue the writ of assistance
here brought in question."
The leading case in Colorado where the statutes
direct the manner of conducting an execution sale similar
to the provisions of the above quoted Eules of Procedure in Utah is the case of Victor Investment Co. v.
Roerig, 22 Colo. App. 257, 124 Pac. 349. This was a collateral attack to set aside an execution sale and to cancel
the sheriff's deed on a judgment for $113.85 and costs.
The property had been bid in at the sheriff's sale for
the sum of $100.00. The value of the property was at
least $2,000.00, encumbered with a mortgage of $1,200.00.
The trial court concluded that inadequacy of price and
21
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circumstances of unfairness justified it in nullifying the
sale. The following excerpts from the Court of Appeals'
opinion are pertinent:
"We have not been referred to any authority
in support of the conclusion that under such circumstances the bid of $100.00 for the property
at the execution sale was grossly out of proportion to its true value. The general trend of
judicial opinion seems to be to the contrary, especially where the debtor is allowed by law a right
of redemption from the sale. 'At judicial sales,
where there is a redemption, it is a well-known
fact that lands, unless where necessary to secure
the debt, are rarely sold at anything approximating their real value. Such purchases are not looked upon as a desirable mode of investment. There
is seldom competition. The creditor, for the most
part, has to take the land in satisfaction of his
debt and wait for it to be redeemed/ * # *"
"It is probably true that the officer in making
the levy followed the usual custom of filing a
certificate of levy with the county recorder, and
it is a matter of presumption that a duplicate of
the certificate of sale issued to the purchaser was
recorded, as provided by law. It is not claimed
that appellee did not have knowledge of the judgment against him, and he also knew that it wras
unsatisfied. His remaining in ignorance of the
execution was due to inattention to his own
affairs, as was also his failure to protect whatever equity there was in the family residence by
taking advantage of the homestead law. It would
seem, then, that he has only himself to blame for
his misfortune, from which equity is powerless
to relieve him. The courts are without power to
arbitrarily extend the statutory period for re-
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demption, for the purpose of relieving the hardships of individual cases, in the absence of some
recognized ground for equitable interference. The
attitude of the appellant in holding to the advantage obtained through legal forms may be characterized as hard and unconscionable, but such
shortcomings are cognizable only in foro conscientise, and not in foro legis. To sustain the
decree of the district court upon the facts appearing in this record would be to declare the execution of a sheriff's deed, after sale under execution
and expiration of the time allowed for redemption, the excuse for the institution of a new litigation. The judgment must be reversed."
There are many California decisions involving the
power of Court to set aside an execution sale and
sheriff's deed issued pursuant thereto on both direct
and collateral attack. One of the earliest cases is Smith
v. Randall, 6 Cal. 47; 2 Pacific States Keports 47. This
was a direct attack upon the execution sale by way of
an order to show cause. The trial court set aside the
sale but on appeal the Supreme Court sustained the
sale. Eeversing the trial court's judgment the Supreme
Court wrote:
"The respondent contends that the seizure
and sale of said land was illegal and void, because: 1st. The notice of sale did not particularly
describe the land, and said notice was not posted
twenty days before the day of sale. 2d. That
defendant being the owner of personal property
sufficient to satisfy the judgment, could not waive
the necessity of having such personal property
sold in preference to the land, because the rights
of the mortgagee would be prejudiced by a sale of
the land. 3d. The land consisted of separate
23
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parcels, and was sold as one tract. 4th. The price
for which the land was sold is greatly inadequate
to its value.
"It has been often decided that the provisions
of statutes similar to ours, with respect to levy
and notice of sale under execution, are merely
directory, and the failure of the officers to comply with the requirements of the law, in this
respect, would not vitiate such sale, but the
party aggrieved by his neglect is left to his remedy by an action against the officer. 6 Mun. I l l ,
3 Bibb, 216. This rule is founded in justice and
sound policy."
Bechtel v. Weir, 152 Cal. 443; 93 Pac, 75; 15 LRA
(N'S) 549. This decision holds that the failure of the
sheriff to sell separate parcels of land separately and in
selling them en masse does not render the sale void subject to collateral attack. Here the court said:
"We have so far considered the question of
the sale to the extent of determining that, at the
worst, it was not void, but voidable merely, and
that respondent's remedy was by direct proceedings within a seasonable time to vacate the sale, —
proceedings which were never taken. But equally
demonstrable is the proposition that, in the absence of fraud and injury shown, the sale en
masse of the two parcels of land, under the circumstances indicated by the sheriff's return, was
not even irregular, but was a perfectly valid exercise of power."
Another California case which is relevant to this
discussion is Morris v. Winans, 30 Cal. App. 575; 159
Pac. 213. An execution sale was held upon a judgment
for $189.62. No motion was made to set aside the execu24
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tion nor the sale thereon and a sheriff's certificate of
sale and deed were issued to the purchaser. The execution debtor commenced an independent collateral action
to declare null and void the sheriff's certificate and deed.
It appears that there had been a first judgment in the
action which was vacated on appeal and upon re-trial
a new judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff.
The writ of execution through error described the first
judgment but in all other particulars was regular and
conformed to the second judgment properly setting out
the amount thereof, etc. The following excerpt indicates
the limitation in collateral attacks against an execution
sale:
"It is claimed, first, that the execution sale
was void because in the writ the date of the entry
of judgment was misstated in that the date given
was that of the first judgment which had been
set aside, and not of the last and final judgment
in the action. If this irregularity rendered the
writ entirely void, plaintiff was entitled to relief;
otherwise not. If the writ was merely irregular
and subject to an amendment, the plaintiff cannot attack it in this way as against the defendant,
a purchaser for value."
The court decided that the irregularity described
did not render the sale void.
Batini v. Ivamick, 105 Cal. App. 391, 287 Pac. 523.
This action is of particular interest in this instant case.
This was a collateral attack upon a sheriff's sale and
deed issued pursuant thereto. It was agreed that there
was no irregularity as to any proceedings up to the
25
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time of the issuance of the writ of execution under
which the sheriff's sale was made. The appellants contended in making the sale no legal or sufficient notice
thereof was given and that the property sold consisting
of three parcels of real estate was sold en masse. In
disposing of the first contention the Court confirmed
the doctrine of Smith vs. Randall, supra, in the following
language:
"Plaintiff rests his claim upon a sheriff's
deed. Defendants contend that the deed is void
and of no effect. Both sides here agree that the
sole question presented both in the court below
and here is on the validity of said sheriff's deed.
The trial court held that the deed was effective
to transfer title and entered its decree in favor
of plaintiff, and the defendants appeal. At the
outset, it may be noted that no claim of irregularity is made as to any proceeding up to the time
of the issuance of the writ of execution under
which the sheriff's sale was made. In other words,
the writ of execution was regularly issued. Appellants contend that in making the sale no legal or
sufficient notice thereof was given and that the
property sold, consisting of three parcels of real
estate, was sold en masse.* * *"
"As stated, a review of the cited authorities
will disclose, beyond dispute, that our courts are
still committed to the earlier rule. Particularly
is this true where the attack is collateral and
no showing, other than of defective or insufficient
notice, is made. Doubtless much well-directed
criticism may appear justifiable and many plausible arguments might be advanced against the
holding. But all of these arguments have been
weighed and considered and found insufficient to
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disturb the rule. Obviously, the courts have had
in mind the harmful results following an easy
voiding of judicial sales and have decided that
mere deviation from the statute would not bring
such results, unless by the statute itself so provided. And further than this, the courts have
always lent a willing ear to the debtor who could
show fraud or unfairness in the sale of his property, and where a proper showing has been made
full relief has followed. No such showing is attempted here."
As to the second contention the court held that such
action by the sheriff did not render the sale void but
only voidable and that such defect could only be reached
by direct motion to set aside the sale.
Mitchell v. Alpha Hardware & Supply Co., 7 Cal.
App. (2d) 52; 45 Pac. (2d) 442, decided that in a collateral attack upon an execution sale after the period
of redemption had expired that it is too late to attack
the sale on the ground that the property was sold en
masse instead of in separate parcels. In support of its
conclusion the court cited Gregory v. Bovier, 77 Gal. 121,
19 P. 232.
Knapp v. Rose, 32 Cal. (2d) 530; 197 Pac. (2d) 7.
By an independent action in equity the plaintiff sought
to set aside a sale upon writ of enforcement. The court
after discussing the difference under California practice between a writ of execution and a writ of enforcement held that such objection was an irregularity which
could be raised only by a motion to set aside the sale
and not by separate proceeding for that purpose. The
27
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court cited Culver v. Scarborough, 73 Cal. App. 441,144;
238 Pac. 1104, 1105, and quoted the following from said
decision:
"At the outset it may be stated as a general
rule supported by many authorities that a proceeding to set aside a sale under execution, excepting where some special facts are alleged which
may create jurisdiction in a court of equity, the
proper procedure is by motion to vacate the sale
in the action under which it is claimed any irregularities occurred."
Passing to the State of Montana there is an interesting group of decisions very much in point. The first
is Thomas vs. Thomas, 44 Mont. 102; 119 Pac. 283. This
case was a collateral attack upon a foreclosure sale.
The purchaser after receiving the sheriff's deed petitioned the court to be put in possession of the property.
The appellant contested this application primarily because the premises consisted of several known lots and
parcels of land which were not sold separately. The
court said:
«• * * The statute requiring known pieces and
parcels of land to be sold separately is merely
directory. At most, the sale in gross is voidable,
and not void. It is not open to collateral attack.
There is not anything in the statute to indicate
an intention on the part of the lawmaking body
to declare the sale void for failure to sell separately, and there are, we think, many reasons,
founded in equitable considerations, why it should
not be so considered.* * * At most, the failure
to sell separately is a mere irregularity, which
may or may not result in prejudice to the defend28
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ant. If he deems himself aggrieved, he may move
to have the sale set aside and the property resold,
or he may proceed by bill in equity. Either
method would constitute a direct attack upon the
sale. But he ought not to be permitted to remain
silent and inactive until demand is made for possession, and then resist such demand by collateral
attack upon the proceedings leading up to the
sale."
Fox vs. Curry, 96 Mont. 212, 29 Pac. (2d) 663. The
plaintiff in this action recovered a money judgment and
caused execution to be issued thereon. Defendant moved
to set aside the sale and upon denial of his motion
appealed. Although this was a direct attack on the sale
the appellate court refused to reverse the judgment.
In part it said:
"It is noteworthy that the defendant, the
judgment debtor, or some one representing him,
might have been present at the sale, and might
have directed the order in which the property
should be sold. But he was not there, nor was he
represented. The sale was made at public auction,
and the only persons present were the sheriff and
Mr. Young. After the sheriff was apprised of
the condition upon which Mr. Young would bid,
it would have been an idle ceremony to have
offered the parcels separately. Had there been
other persons present, doubtless it would have
been the imperative duty of the sheriff to offer
them separately. The fact that the property was
sold in gross under the circumstances is not a
sufficient reason for setting the sale aside. So
far as the record shows, the entire transaction
was in good faith. In the circumstances, the
property could have been sold only in the manner
29
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in which it was, in gross. And 'the creditor is not
to be foreclosed of his effort to collect his debt
by the mere want of bidders for the different
parcels.' Burton v. Kipp, supra; Thomas v.
Thomas, 44 Mont. 102, 119 P. 283, Ann. Cas.
1913B, 616. If the judgment debtor had attended
the sale, of which it must be held that he had
due notice, and had he required the property to
be sold in separate parcels, as was his right, then
the provisions for redemption would have afforded protection to him, and he might have made
redemption of any parcel sold. That he did not
follow this course is his own fault."
Hcrngan vs. Yale Oil Corporation, 124 Mont. 1, 217
Pac. (2d) 1084. Under the Montana probate practice a
proceeding for the private sale of decedent's land is
separate from the administration of his estate, although
it arises in the course of the administration and is in
the nature of an action of which the presentation of the
petition is the commencement and the order confirming
sale is the final judgment. The jurisdiction over it is
not included in the general jurisdiction over the administration. After an order confirming the private sale
of real estate by an administrator with the will annexed
and after his delivery of deed to the purchaser two
minor devisees in an independent action sought to quiet
title to the real estate involved. The petition for the
sale of the property and the order to show cause complied
with the requirements of the statute. Jurisdiction was,
therefore, conferred upon the court. The publication of
the notice of sale by the administrator with the will
annexed did not comply with the provisions of the statute. It was held that since the court held jurisdiction
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over all of the parties interested in the estate that irregularities in the conduct of the sale could only be shown
upon direct appeal "* * * The regularity could not be
attacked in a collateral proceeding.* * *" This decision
was based upon the prior ruling of the Court in Plains
Land and Improvement Company vs. Lynch, 38 Mont.
271, 289; 99 Pac. 847.
The decision of the Supreme Court of Idaho in
Coghlan vs. City of Boise, 36 Ida. 613; 212 Pac. 867,
involved a collateral attack by way of an action to quiet
title to a certain parcel of land which had been sold
pursuant to a judgment entered in a judicial foreclosure
of a tax lien. Under the Idaho statute a judgment debtor
being present at an execution sale of real property had
the right to direct the order in which such property
should be sold. The court said:
"The sale of separate parcels of real property en masse in disregard of [the statute] is not
void, but only voidable and subject to be set
aside on timely and proper application, and a
sale en masse is not prohibited by said section
where the lots or parcels cannot be separately
sold."
Mt. Vernon National Bank vs. Morse, 128 Ore. 64;
264 Pac. 439, contains the following statement:
"The order of the court striking the allegation from the answer is sustained. Sale of land
or an interest therein on execution without the
statutory notice is an irregularity when the court
has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of
the parties. For the purpose of directing a sale
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of the real property, the court, in the state of
Washington, had jurisdiction both of the parties
and the subject-matter. The sale was confirmed.
Defendant's attack thereon is collateral and is
therefore not available to defendant in this
• , • action."
Whitworth v. McKee, 32 Wash. 83; 72 Pac. 1046,
was a collateral attack by way of an independent action
to set aside a sale of real property on an execution.
The defendant contended that because the sheriff had
not made search for personal property with which to 4
satisfy the writ before levying upon the real property,
the sale was void. The court said:
"* * * it is not the rule that a sale of real
property is void merely because the sheriff failed
to return that he had been unable to find
sufficient personalty to satisfy the writ before
levying upon the real estate of the judgment
debtor, even when the statute expressly provides,
which ours does not, that the sheriff shall first
levy upon the debtor's personal property. In a
collateral action brought to set aside the sale, it
will be presumed that the officer performed his
duty in this respect. But statutes of this character are rarely held mandatory: the better rule
is that they are directory merely, furnishing a
ground upon which a confirmation of a sale might
be successfully resisted, were it shown that there
was personal property out of which the judgment
could have been satisfied, but they do not make
a return of the sale of real property, which fails
to show that no personal property could be found
out of which the judgment could be made, void
on its face. On the contrary, such a return is
good as against any form of attack other than
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direct assault. Freeman on Executions (3d Ed.),
Sec. 279."
Oliver v. Dougherty, 8 Arizona 65; 68 Pac. 553,
was a collateral assault on a sheriff's sale on execution
by way of an action to quiet title. An Arizona statute
provided that the writ of execution must require the
officer to satisfy the judgment out of personal property
of the debtor before resorting to his real property. It
was claimed the sheriff did not conform to the mandates
of this statute. The court answered this contention as
follows:
"* * * Such a provision incorporated in an
execution according to the requirements of a
statute is but a direction to the sheriff, and it
is such a direction as the judgment debtor may
require him to comply with before sale. It nowhere appears in the evidence that Oliver made
any such demand. The appellants offered evidence to show that, at the time the execution was
levied and the sale was made, Oliver had personal
property, which offer was denied by the court,
and we think properly. There was no offer to
show that Oliver had made a demand upon the
sheriff that the sheriff refused, and that the
purchaser at the sale knew of all those conditions,
but it was for the first time to show that the judgment debtor had property. Whether he had ample
personal property to satisfy the judgment, or
not, cannot affect the title of an innocent purchaser. If the sheriff was executing the writ not
in conformity with its terms, and was either
ignorant of the fact that the judgment debtor
held personal property, or, being aware of it,
was purposely avoiding his duty, it was the right
and it became the duty of the judgment debtor
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to call the attention of the sheriff to the fact
that he had personal property, and that he was
willing to turn it over for that purpose, and, if
he refused to do so, to compel him by proper
processes to first make the money out of the
personal property which the judgment debtor
was turning over to him. If the judgment debtor
neglected to so protect himself, and permitted
the sheriff to proceed to sell real estate, the sale
is valid, especially where there is an innocent
purchaser. With the evidence as it stood on the
record, the court was justified in refusing to
admit evidence of the existence of personal property."
Bauer v. Hertweck, 175 Cal. 278; 165 Pac. 946, was
an action wherein a judgment debtor attempted to quiet
title to real property against a purchaser at an execution sale on a judgment entered against plaintiff. He
contended that neither the judgment plaintiff, sheriff
nor execution sale purchaser notified him of the proposed
sale. In overruling this contention the court said:
"But there was no obligation upon them to
give him any such notice. The statute defines how
notice of an execution sale must be given. To
say that a sale may be set aside because some
other notice was not given would be to amend
the statute, and this we cannot, of course, do.
When the officer conducting the sale has done
the acts prescribed by the Code, he has done
his full duty. He is not required to search for
the debtor and give him any further notice than
that which the law exacts. Nor is any such duty
imposed upon the judgment creditor."

34
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

With respect to inadequacy of consideration as a
grounds for nullifying a sheriff's sale on collateral
attack after issuance of the sheriff's deed the following
statement by Judge Story is most pertinent:
"* * * Inadequacy of consideration is not of
itself a distinct principle of relief in equity.
The common law knows no such principle. The
consideration be it more or less supports the contract. Common sense knows no such principle.
The value of a thing is what it will produce, and
admits no precise standard. If courts of equity
were to unravel all these transactions they would
throw everything into confusion and set afloat
the contracts of mankind. Such a consequence
would of itself, be sufficient to show the inconvenience and impracticability, if not injustice,
of adopting the doctrine that mere inadequacy
of consideration should form a distinct ground
of relief." (1 Story's Equity Jurisprudence, Sec.
245).
The appellant Dowse cites the following additional
authorities as sustaining the legal principles herein
asserted by him to be applicable in the instant case:
1. Irregularities in conduct of execution sale which do
not void the sale cannot be asserted, by a judgment
debtor in an independent action collaterally attacking the sale and seeking to quiet title against the
sheriff's deed after period of redemption has expired and sheriff's deed has issued to the purchaser:
Bird v. Kitchens,
795;

Ark

; 221 S.W. (2d)

Gross v. Simsack, 364 Pa. 337; 72 Atl. (2d)
103;
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Knox v. Noggle, 279 Pa. 302; 196 Atl. (2d) 118;
Bonner v. Lockhart, 236 Ala. 171; 181 South.
767;
Horkan v. Eason, 10 Ga. App. 236; 73 S.E.
352;
Dixon v. Peacock, 30 Okla. 87; 141 Pac. 429;
Sheehan v. All Person, etc., 80 Cal. App. 393;
252 Pac. 337;
Sellers v. Johnson, 207 Ga. 644; 63 S.E. (2d)
904;
White v. Adams, 52 Cal. 435; 1 Pac. States.
Rep. 435;
Hamilton v. Waters, 93 Cal. App. 866; 210
Pac. (2d) 67.
2. Inadequacy of consideration or of bid price at an
execution sale, in absence of proof of acts of overreaching or bad faith on the part of a judgment
creditor, is not a valid ground to nullify the execution sale and cancel the sheriff's deed issued pursuant thereto in an independent collateral action
instituted by the judgment debtor subsequent to the
issuance of the deed.
Knox v. Noggle, supra;
Gross v. Simsack, supra;
H.O.L.C. v. Edwards, 329 Pa. 529; 198 Atl. 123,
124;
Sellers v. Johnson, supra;
Sikes et al. v. Beaver, et al.,
Sup. Ct. Ga.
; 157 S.E. 467;
City of Sanford v. Ashton, 131 Fla. 759; 179
South 765;
Solomon v. Neubrecht, 300 Mich. 177; 1 N.W.
(2d) 501;
36
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Lawyers Co-op. Publ. Co. v. Bennett, 34 Fla.
302; 16 South 185;
Sellers v. Johnson, 207 Ga. 644; 63 S.E. (2d)
904;
Marr v. Marr, 73 N.J. Eq. 643; 70 Atl. 375;
McAlvay v. Consumers Salt Co., 112 Cal. App.
383; 297 Pac. 135;
Bauer v. Hertweck, 175 Cal. 278; 165 Pac. 946;
Pavlovich v. Watts, 46 Cal. App. 103; 115 Pac.
(2d) 511;
Dewey v. Loomis, 113 Kan. 750; 216 Pac. 271;
Elliott &. Healy v. Wirth, 34 Idaho 797; 198
Pac. 757;
McLain Land & Investment Co. v. Swofford
Bros. Drv Goods, 11 Okla. 429; 68 Pac.
502;
Dickinson-Beed-Banderson Co. et al. v. Markley, 117 Okla. 17,244 Pac. 754;
St. Paul Trust & Savings Bank v. Olson, 52
N.D. 315;202N.W. 472;
Burton v. Kipp, 30 Mont. 275; 76 Pac. 563.
3. The objection that land was not offered for sale in
separate parcels by the sheriff at an execution sale
cannot be asserted in an independent action seeking
to set aside the sale instituted after the sheriff's
deed has issued to the purchaser at such sale.
Baymond v. Halborn, 23 Wis. 57;
Coulters v. Meiggs, 58 B.I. 30; 191 Atl. 115;
Beed v. Gourley,
Tex. C.A
; 109 S.W.
(2d) 242.
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4. A sale of real property on execution is not void
because the sheriff failed to satisfy the judgment
out of unexempt personal property of the judgment
debtor before resorting to real property of the
debtor and such irregularity is not a ground to nullify the sale on a collateral attack thereon in an
independent action. Such irregularity can only be
asserted in a direct assault by way of motion to set
aside the sale.
Solomon v. Neubrecht, supra;
Clark v. Fell, 139 Pa. 469; 22 Atl. 649;
Smith v. Bandall, supra;
Jacobsen v. Wigen, 52 Minn. 6; 53 N.W. 1016.
5. Where, as in Utah, neither a legislative enactment
nor Rules of Civil Procedure require that the judgment creditor or the sheriff give personal notice of
a proposed execution sale to a judgment debtor, the
absence of such notice is no ground upon which to
nullify the sale.
Bock v. Losekamp, 179 Cal. 674; 179 Pac. 516;
Mortimer v. Young, 53 Cal. App. (2d) 317; 127
Pac. (2d) 950.
The foregoing authorities clearly teach
(a) that the provision of Kule 69 (b) U.R.C.P. requiring the sheriff to satisfy the judgment out
of personal property and if sufficient personal
property cannot be found then out of the debtor's real property, is directory only and not
mandatory. Violation of this rule and of the
directions of the writ may be a ground for setting aside the sale on direct attack but never
on collateral attack.
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(b) Likewise under Eule 69 (e) (1) defect in the
notice of sale is voidable only on motion to set
aside the same and is not a defect which affords
relief in a collateral action to quiet title.
(c) The requirement of rule 69 (e) (3) that when the
sale of real property consisting of several known
lots or parcels that they must be sold separately
when the judgment creditor is present at the
sale and directs the order of sale is directory
and a violation of same does not afford relief
except on a direct motion to set aside the sale.
It is unavailable to the debtor in a subsequent
action to quiet title.
(d) That there is no duty upon either the sheriff
conducting an execution sale or the judgment
creditor to give personal notice to or otherwise
notify him of the proposed execution sale.
A summation of the whole matter is found in 23 C.J.
693, 694, Sec. 691, as follows:
"* * * On the other hand, if the defect or
irregularity relied on, whether occurring before
the sale, or in the conduct of the sale, makes the
writ, levy, or sale merely voidable and not void,
it cannot be urged by way of a collateral attack,
but only on a motion to set it aside or in a direct
action instituted for that purpose; and this is
particularly true after the sale has been confirmed. For instance, the want of proper notice of
sale is not ground for a collateral attack on the
sale, as against an innocent purchaser, especially
after confirmation and a finding that due notice
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of the sale was given. So it cannot be urged collaterally that the sale was en masse instead of
in parcels, or that the price for which the property
was sold was inadequate."
An elaborate annotation demonstrating that execution sales en masse instead of in several parcels are
merely voidable and that inadequacy of price cannot be
collaterally attacked but relief must be by way of motion
to set aside the sale and recall the sheriff's certificate
of sale and deed is set forth in 1 A.L.R. 1442, 1443.
It is manifest that when measured against the above
elucidated legal background that much of the testimony
submitted by the Respondent at the trial and admitted
in evidence by the court was entirely irrelevant and
immaterial on the issues of (1) irregularities in the conduct of the execution sale; (2) inadequacy of consideration or bid price; (3) sale of land en masse; (4) failure
to satisfy judgment out of unexempt personal property,
and (5) absence of personal notice of the sale to Respondent. The court committed gross error in admitting
and considering the same upon these issues. This evidence runs through the entire case. The Appellant
Dowse here invites attention to examples of this type
of inadmissible evidence. There is the testimony of the
witness, Backman (with included exhibits) (R, 72-76)
which attempts to prove that the land levied on was
composed of four separate parcels. The testimony of
the witness, LeCheminant (R. 77-78) which was directed
to the question of excessive levy. The testimony of
Respondent Pender (R. 104-117), wherein an attempt
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was made to prove that he had available personal property upon which the levy could have been made and his
lack of knowledge of time and place of sale is another
example of this type of immaterial and irrelevant evidence. The testimony of Larch, one of Respondent's
witnesses (R. 118-128) was also directed towards the
proof of the existence of personal property of the Respondent upon which the writ of execution could have
been levied. The testimony of Deputy Sheriff Bleak (R.
136-144) pertaining to the method of the conduct of the
sheriff's sale was not only inadmissible on these issues
but was an attempt to impeach the sale in a collateral
attack.
Without burdening this brief with a further detailed
reference to this type of inadmissible evidence the
Appellant Dowse contends that the action of the court
in admitting it was error which highly prejudiced his
rights in this case.
As a direct consequence of the trial court admitting
and considering irrelevant and immaterial evidence of
the nature hereinabove immediately described the court
also committed serious error prejudicial to Dowse in
making the following Findings of Fact:
10. (Pertaining to the existence of personal property belonging to Pender of sufficient value to
satisfy the judgment) R. 241;
11. (Determining that the real property consisted
of four non-contiguous parcels of land) R.
242;
12. (Attempting to fix the value of the land levied
upon) R. 242;
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13. (That the real property was sold en masse)
B. 242;
14. (That plaintiff had no actual notice of the
levy and execution sale) (B. 242-243;
15. (That the levy was excessive and bid price
inadequate) R. 243;
16. (The existence of personal property of
Pender upon which levy could have been
made) R. 243.
Therefore, on this facet of the case the appellant
Dowse asserts and vigorously contends that the trial
court committed error most prejudicial to him. First,
in admitting irrelevant and immaterial evidence on the
five issues above enumerated, and, secondly, in making
the findings of fact above enumerated based upon this
inadmissible evidence.

n.
WHETHER THE EXECUTION AND DELIVERY BY
PENDER UNTO DORIS TRUST COMPANY, A CORPORATION, OF THE QUIT CLAIM DEED DATED JULY
22, 1949 (EX. J), EFFECTED A SATISFACTION AND
DISCHARGE OF THE JUDGMENT FOR $22.80 IN
FAVOR OF DOWSE ENTERED IN ACTION 86,895, AND
UPON WHICH THE WRIT OF EXECUTION WAS
ISSUED?
Dowse instituted and prosecuted an action against
Pender in the Third District Court designated as action
86,895, wherein Dowse sought to quiet title against
Pender to Lots 18 and 19, Block 1, North Columbia
Subdivision and also to collect damages from Pender
for slander of title (R. 59).
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This action resulted in a judgment dated November
4, 1949, quieting title in Dowse as against Pender in and
to said land and awarding to Dowse his costs therein
(Exhibit A). It was upon this judgment that writ of
execution was issued (Exhibit H). Thereafter on November 29, 1949 Pender delivered a deed in favor of Doris
Trust Company quit-claiming said real property (Exhibit J ) . This deed, however, was dated July 22, 1949.
Two of the issues of fact to be determined at trial as
set forth in the pretrial order (R. 34-35) were:
"4. Did S. W. Dowse agree to satisfy the judgment in connection with the transaction
wherein he paid $100.00 to Rennold Pender
and received a quit claim deed from Pender?
5. Did Rennold Pender agree to forego an
appeal in case 86,895 in connection with the
transaction mentioned in paragraph 4 above."
By Finding of Fact 7 (R. 241) the court found:
"That on November 29, 1949, the said Rennold Pender upon the solicitation and request of
S. W. Dowse and in consideration of the payment
by S. W. Dowse to Rennold Pender of $100.00
executed and delivered to said S. W. Dowse a quit
claim deed to the property involved in Civil
Action 86,895. That it was agreed between the
said S. W. Dowse and Rennold Pender that said
transaction was to settle all differences arising in
and out of said case, Civil No. 86,895, and to
terminate the said Rennold Pender's right of
appeal from the judgment entered therein."
Dowse contends that the part of said finding reading as follows:
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"* * * to settle all differences arising in and
out of said case, Civil No. 86,895, and * * *"
is clearly erroneous and is not supported by the evidence
in this case. With this quoted phrase eliminated from
the finding it will be correct inasmuch as it will then
determine that the purpose of the quit claim deed mentioned in said finding was to terminate Pender's right
of appeal from the judgment entered against him in said
case and not satisfy the judgment for costs against him.
It is important to determine the consequences of
Pender executing and delivering the quit claim deed
(Exhibit J) and of Dowse's acceptance of same. A court
in adjudicating the effect of a quit claim deed in circumstances similar to those of the instant case will look
into the intent of the parties as shown by evidence of the
surrounding facts and circumstances. If such evidence
shows that the parties intended a specific purpose by the
use of said quit claim deed said intention will be recognized and made effective. The case of Chesney v. Valley
Live Stock Co., 34 Wyo. 378; 244 Pac. 216, 44 A.L.R.
1255, illustrates this principle. In that case a quit claim
deed was given by a mortgagee to the owner of the mortgaged property who had assumed and agreed to pay
the mortgage. It was contended by the property owner
and its judgment creditors junior to the mortgage that
the quit claim deed released the mortgage. The court
examined into the circumstances of the giving of the
deed and concluded:
"While it is possibly true that a quitclaim
deed from a mortgagee to the mortgagor or his
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assignee, of the mortgaged premises, is prima
facie a release and satisfaction of the mortgage
lien * * * the court will look into the intent of
the parties, and if the intent is not to release
the mortgage, that intent will prevail * * *."
The cases of Ckausse v. Bank of Garland, supra,
and O'Reilley v. McLean, 84 Ut. 551, 37 Pac. (2d) 770,
reaffirmed the rule that the effect of a quit claim deed
is dependent upon the intention of the parties thereto
and that the court will examine into the facts and circumstances surrounding the giving of said deed to determine this intention.
Exhibit "J," being the quit claim deed from Pender
to Doris Trust Company, is dated July 22, 1949, but
was not recorded until November 29, 1949. The judgment in action 89,895 was dated and filed on November
4, 1949. Backman, the attorney for Pender in action
89,895, stated in the present case as follows (R. 92):
"Q. I note this Exhibit " J " is dated July 22, 1949,
but not recorded until November 29, 1949,
had that been in your file all the time from
the time of its execution in July until final
payment on its delivery of this $100.00 payment?
"A. As I recall I had Mr. Pender sign the deed
in July, and I think at that time there were
some negotiations on the part of Mr. Steiner
for this property which is here described and
that could have been in fact this deed which
you have reference to.
"Q. Exhibit "J"?
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"A. Could have been the deed that was delivered
to Mr. Duncan at the time he paid the $100.00,
in 1950, that is just possible.
"Q. You mean November of 1949?
"A. No, in 1950.
"Q. I show you the recording date on this.
"A. Yes, November of 1949, thank you, Mr. Pugsley.''
Further, Backman testified that in a street encounter
with Duncan, attorney for Dowse in action 86,895, after
the judgment was entered, Duncan inquired of Backman
if Backman could secure a quit claim deed from Pender
to the property involved in that action and offered to
pay Pender $100.00 consideration (R. 63). Backman
admitted that Duncan informed him that Dowse wanted
a quit claim deed to cut off the appeal period because
Dowse had a deal pending with a Mr. West, an attorney
(R. 63-64). Backman promised to contact Pender. Later
Backman informed Duncan that Pender had authorized
Backman to deliver a quit claim to the property and had
executed a deed for delivery to Duncan or to whomever
he directed (R. 64). The name of the grantee was left
blank in the deed (R. 64). Backman at first denied that
Exhibit " J " was the deed delivered to Duncan for the
sum of $100.00 (R. 64-65) but thereafter in his examination by Mr. Pugsley, above quoted, apparently corrected his testimony. According to Backman, Duncan
called at his office, paid the $100.00 and "picked up the
deed" (R. 65). Backman also stated that in his conversations with Duncan that nothing was said concerning
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the cost judgment against Pender (E. 66). In October
or November Backman first learned that the execution
sale had been held and after the delivery of the sheriff's
deed he interviewed Duncan (E. 68) and questioned him
as to the cost judgment asserting that he informed
Duncan that when he delivered the quit claim deed (Exhibit "J") to Duncan and Duncan paid the $100.00 that
he, Backman, assumed that if Dowse was going to press
the cost judgment something would have been said about
it or the amount would have been deducted from the
$100.00 (E. 68). Backman claimed that Duncan asserted
that he could not explain the transaction and asserted
that it was a mistake and that he, Duncan, knew nothing
of the cost bill (E. 68).
Duncan explains the anomaly of Exhibit " J " being
dated in July, 1949, as follows (E. 178-179):
"A. This was prepared in July of 1949, July
22nd, or 1949 at the time Mr. Pender had
placed a deed on the record to Lots 18 and
19, Block 1, North Columbia Subdivision,
which was then in the name of Mr. Steiner,
who was acting for Mr. Dowse, as I recall
I talked to — I think I wrote a letter to Mr.
Pender and in response to the letter, Mr.
Backman called me and said he would take
the deed off for $250.00. Now, I might explain at the same time that the same grantor,
that Mr. Steiner, for Mr. Dowse had purchased this property, owned another piece of
property in the north part of the city and
Mr. Dowse sold that piece to Mr. Pender for
$250.00, and that Mr. Backman said he didn't
think we had the right grantor because there
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was an elderly woman that lived in Los Angeles. I said if there is any doubt, question
about that, to give us our $250.00 back and
we will give you the deeds to both pieces.
He said he wouldn't give us anything back.
He wanted $250.00 to take this deed off placed
on the record subsequent to our deed to this
property, Lots 18 and 19, Block 1, North
Columbia Sub-division.
"Q. After that time, did the trial of the case
86,895, S.W. Dowse v. Kennold Pender go forward?
"A. Yes it did."
As to the delivery of Exhibit " J " in consideration
of the payment of $100.00 Duncan testified as follows
(R. 180-182):
"A. Well, as I recall, from refreshing my recollections here, it was on the 9th of November,
cost bill was filed and by the decree our title
was quieted to that property and we had a
sale of it; we were negotiating a sale with
Mr. David West, who represented the purchaser, and Mr. West—the sale was help
(sic) up—I think the purchasers were represented by both Mr. West and Mr. Wilde, and
Mr. Wilde had testified that the transaction
was still alive, his client would still pay
$10,000.00 for the property if the title were
quieted and it was on that basis Judge
Hogensen ruled we hadn't proved any slander
of title. After we got to this transaction,
after the trial, and Judge Hogensen had
quieted title, I had drawn the Findings and
so forth, I completed my negotiations, but
Mr. West and Mr. Wilde did not want to go
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further until they were certain that the time
for appeal had been terminated, and at that
time, of course, it was 90 days, and I went to
Mr. Backman and asked him if he intended
to appeal. He said 'no.' And I said, "Will
you give us a quit claim deed or any other
consideration, we waived the right to appeal."
He said, "You are going to make something
out of this, I think you ought to give me
$100.00." He said, "I still have the deed you
were talking about last July."
"Q. Is that the deed, Exhibit "J," in your hands %
"A. Yes, I paid the $100.00 to him, as he testified,
and I think I indicated to him at that time
it was a shake down, but I paid it. * * *
"Q.

(By Mr. Pugsley) At the time of the payment of $100.00 and delivery of the deed to
you, was there any discussion between you
and Mr. Backman with respect to a cost bill
previously served and his office %

"A. None whatever.
"Q. Was it your intention in paying that $100.00
to settle that cost judgment % * * *
"A. None whatever, all I was doing was cutting
off his right to appeal as indicated.
"Q. Were you ever authorized by Mr. Dowse,
your client, to satisfy that cost judgment?
"A. No, sir."
Duncan further testified that he had a conference
with Backman in Duncan's office after the sheriff's deed
had issued wherein Backman asked the reason for taking
cost judgment. At that time Backman stated he over49
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looked the costs and he understood Dowse had a judgment for same. Duncan informed him that he not only
had the judgment but a sheriff's deed had been issued.
Backman desired to know what could be done about it.
Duncan said he would recommend to Dowse that if
Pender would pay the cost judgment and the sheriff's
additional costs on sale, for Dowse to quit claim the
property to Pender (K. 186-187). Backman replied that
he would talk to his client and left Duncan's office (R.
187). Some time later Backman returned and informed
Duncan that he thought that Duncan should give a deed
because he (Dowse) had paid this $100.00. Duncan
denied that he had ever informed Backman that the
cost judgment was a mistake (E. 187) and denied that
there was any mistake in serving and filing the cost bill
(R. 188). Duncan declared on cross-examination that at
the time he paid the $100.00 at Backman's office he said
nothing about the cost judgment (R. 189).
It is from this evidence that the intent of the parties
must be determined.
Did Dowse pay the $100.00 and accept the deed for
the purpose only of foreclosing Pender's appeal time of
90 days or did the giving of the quit claim deed by
Pender and the payment of the $100.00 by Dowse effect
a complete settlement and compromise of the action?
Backman admits that at no time in the negotiations
with Duncan prior to the issuance of the sheriff's deed
was anything said of the cost judgment. There is not a
line of evidence in the case that Pender required not
only the payment of the $100.00 but also a satisfaction
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of the judgment as the price of the quit claim deed.
Backman acknowledged receipt of copy of the judgment
which carried costs to Dowse. He also admitted that the
cost bill had been duly received in his office and that he
took no action either to amend the judgment or to strike
the cost bill. During the entire period of redemption
he remained silent and it was only after the issuance of
the sheriff's deed did he raise a question as to the judgment for costs. Dowse had a buyer of the property soon
after the entry of the judgment quieting title in him.
In order to make his sale it was incumbent upon him to
make the judgment final. It was for this reason that
he desired, acting through Duncan, to secure from
Pender a waiver of the right of appeal. He therefore
asked for this quit claim deed. Pender exacted the sum
of $100.00 for the deed but neither he nor his attorney,
Backman, said anything about the cost judgment although
there was obvious evidence of its existence in Backman's
office. This situation which is implicit in both Backman's
and Duncan's testimony makes certain that Pender gave
the deed and accepted the sum of $100.00 and Dowse
accepted the deed with the intent of terminating immediately Pender's right of appeal and not as a final and
complete settlement of the action. At the time the deed
was given and the consideration paid the parties through
their attorneys talked only of ending Pender's right of
appeal. Backman admits this in his testimony and Duncan positively affirms it. This is a case of a judgment
creditor paying a consideration to his judgment debtor
for a deed and with both parties remaining silent as
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to the disposition of the cost judgment. It is difficult,
almost impossible, to deduce from this situation the conclusion that the transaction was a complete compromise
and settlement. Bather, it confirms Duncan's testimony
that he paid the $100.00 for Dowse and Pender delivered
the deed only for the purpose of securing from Pender
a waiver of his right of appeal. The cost judgment was
not taken into consideration in the negotiations and
transaction and stood outside of the deal. This interpretation of the evidence reconciles any differences between the versions of Backman and Duncan, and makes
the testimony of these two witnesses consistent. It leads
to the conclusion that the cost judgment remained an
obligation of Pender's and there was available to Dowse
all the remedies to enforce the judgment granted by
law. The truth of the transaction is although having
due notice of the existence of this cost judgment, Pender
and Backman in addition to demanding $100.00 for the
deed failed to exact from Dowse a release of the judgment. At no place in the evidence is there any suggestion that Pender exacted from Dowse $100.00 and
a full release of the judgment. It was an after-thought,
purely and simply, that the consideration for the quit
claim deed was the sum of $100.00 and the release of
the judgment. The conclusion is that the part of finding
7, "to settle all differences arising in and out of said
case Civil No. 86,895, and" is clearly erroneous and is
not supported by any evidence in this case. Oppositely,
the evidence does sustain that part of the finding "that
the said transaction was * # * to terminate the said
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Rennold Pender's right of appeal from the judgment
entered therein." (R. 241). Therefore, prejudicial error
was committed by the trial court by including in finding
7 the conclusion that the quit claim deed was delivered
by Pender and the $100.00 paid by Dowse to him to
compromise and settle the case.
III.
WHETHER DOWSE PRACTICED ANY FRAUDULENT DEVICES UPON PENDER IN INITIATING THE
SHERIFFS SALE AND ACQUIRING THE REAL PROPERTY LEVIED UPON WHICH ENTITLES PENDER TO
EQUITABLE RELIEF IN A COLLATERAL ACTION
ATTACKING THE VALIDITY OF THE SHERIFF'S SALE
AND SEEKING CANCELLATION OF THE DEED ISSUED BY THE SHERIFF TO DOWSE?
Finding 17 reads as follows:
"17. That the praecipe delivered to the
sheriff by said defendant S. W. Dowse instructed
the sheriff to sell other real property belonging
to plaintiff than that executed and levied upon.
That the same was stricken from the praecipe at
the request of the sheriff. That the execution
and levy so directed to be made by defendant
S. W. Dowse, was not made to satisfy a valid
existing judgment, but the same was a p a r t of
a conspiracy on the p a r t of said defendant S. W.
Dowse to deprive plaintiff of his property and
to unlawfully obtain title thereto and it was a
fraud upon plaintiff." (R. 243).
By the above finding the court attempted to charge
Dowse with collusion and fraud in causing the writ to
issue on the judgment in his favor and in bidding in
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the real property levied upon by the sheriff at the public
sale. As has been clearly demonstrated, irregularities
of the sheriff's sale of the nature hereinabove discussed
do not constitute fraud. The court cannot consolidate
a series of such irregularities and find therefrom that
thus cumulated they constitute such fraud, overreaching
or sharp practice by the judgment creditor as to justify
the court in nullifying the sheriff's sale. The following
quotation from Victor Inv. Co. v. Roerig, supra, is much
in point;
"It was concluded as matter of law (1) 'that
inadequacy of price is not within itself sufficient
to warrant the setting aside of the sale'; and (2)
'that the circumstances of unfairness proven are
not alone sufficient to invalidate the sale'; but
(3) that the two elements combined were sufficient
to justify the decree. * * * It is believed that
nothing less than collusion between the officer and
the purchaser would justify the cancellation of
the sheriff's deed for the irregularity in making
the levy."
Fraud or overreaching by a judgment creditor which
will authorize a nullification of the sheriff's sale on collateral attack must be of the nature that the court may
find that the judgment debtor has been under some kind
of legal or other restraint which has prevented him
from attending the sale by inducements or circumstances
of a fraudulent character at the instance of the judgment creditor or the purchaser at such sale. (McLain
Land & Investment Company v. Swofford Bros. Dry
Goods Company, supra), or the proof must show that
there was collusion between the sheriff and the judg54
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ment creditor or purchaser. (Myers v. Sanders, 7 Dana
(Ky.) 507; Hill v. Whitfield, 48 N.C. 120).
The evidence in this case exculpates Deputy Sheriff
Bleak from any wrong-doing or collusion with Dowse
or his attorney Duncan. There was not even a suggestion throughout the trial of the case that this public
officer was guilty of any misconduct in violation of his
oath. Any charge of collusion between Bleak and Dowse
or Duncan must be put out of the case.
Did Dowse or Duncan engage in any act which induced Pender to remain away from the sheriff's sale or
did they pursue a course of conduct which lulled him
into security? The authorities hereinbefore cited show
beyond any dispute that there was no duty on Bleak,
the deputy sheriff, Dowse or Duncan to notify Pender
of the proposed sale. Pender was charged with knowledge of the cost judgment against him, and that it might
be executed upon. The evidence shows that he gave the
quit claim deed (Exhibit "J") for the purpose only of
waiving his right of appeal. It is impossible from this
evidence to conclude that Dowse or his attorney Duncan
deliberately and willfully prevented Pender from being
present at the sale. Therefore the elements which characterized the conduct of the judgment creditor and its
counsel in Young vs. Schroeder, 10 Ut. 155, 37 Pac. 252,
161 U.S. 334, 40 Law. Ed. 721,16 Sup. Ct. 512, is entirely
missing in this case. In the Young case counsel for the
judgment creditor not only was the bidder at the sale
but had informed Young that the statutory time for
redemption would not be insisted upon and thereupon
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Young permitted the period for redemption to elapse
without making redemption. Therefore, there is eliminated from consideration in this case the question as
to whether Dowse or Duncan took any action which
induced Pender to remain away from the sale and to
fail to exercise his right of redemption. The evidence
beyond controversy exculpates them from wrong-doing
in this regard.
As to inadequacy of the bid price at the sheriff's
sale it is interesting to analyze the status of the title
to the various parcels of land, all in North Columbia
Subdivision, sold at the execution sale.
Lots 6 and 7, Block 4 were subject to (a) a special
tax sale for paving extension 79 in the amount
of $35.15, costs and interest; (b) a tax sale
to Salt Lake County for general taxes for the
years 1928 to 1935, in an approximate gross
amount of $220.00, plus interest and costs
upon which a tax deed had issued to Salt
Lake County; and (c) a judgment against
Pender in favor of Freeman in the sum of
$13.20. (Exhibit "E").
Lots 2 and 3, Block 4, were subject to the aforesaid judgment in favor of Freeman for $13.20.
(Exhibit "D").
Lots 1, 19 and 20, Block 6, were subject to the
aforesaid Freeman judgment for $13.20. (Exhibit "B").
Lots 2, 3 and 4, Block 8 were subject to (a) the
Freeman judgment of $13.20; and (b) a tax
sale to Salt Lake County for $171.86 for 1949
taxes (thereafter redeemed by Dowse). (Exhibit "F").
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Lots 13 to 21, Block 8, were subject to (a) the
Freeman judgment in the amount of $13.20;
(b) two tax sales to Salt Lake County for
1949 taxes of $12.48 and $24.29, respectively
(thereafter redeemed by Dowse); and (c)
judgment lien in favor of Carl Morandi for
$3,086.44. (Exhibit "C").
The testimony of witness LeCheminant as an expert
on real property values is of little importance because
he insisted that his opinion was based upon good market*
able title (R. 84) and that the values were fair market
values in ordinary commercial sales. He was not testifying as to the value of property at a forced sale on
execution.
The Colorado Supreme Court in Victor Inv. Co. v.
Roerig, supra, quoted from Watt v. McGalliard, 67 111.
513, as follows:
"At judicial sales, where there is a redemption, it is a well-known fact that lands, unless
where necessary to secure the debt, are rarely
sold at anything approximating their real value.
Such purchases are not looked upon as a desirable mode of investment. There is seldom competition. The creditor, for the most part, has
to take the land in satisfaction of his debt and
wait for it to be redeemed. * * *"
When the conduct of Dowse and Duncan is subjected
to microscopic examination there is no parallel with
the conduct of the judgment creditor and its counsel in
the Young case, supra. After Duncan paid the $100.00
to Backman and received the quit claim deed to the
property involved in action 86,895 there was no contact
57
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

between Pender and Dowse or between Duncan and
Backman relative to the instant case until Backman
learned of the sheriff's sale and contacted Duncan and
went to the latter's office. The parties were dealing at
arms length. Pender faced the hazard of a writ of execution on this judgment against him. He took no action
either before the writ was executed or during the period
of redemption. It was through his own carelessness and
neglect that his property was subjected to execution
sale. The situation called for affirmative action on Pender's part to protect his property. He was under no
restraint imposed by Dowse or Duncan. He remained
inactive at his peril. Dowse was under no compulsion
to refrain from pursuing his legal remedies.
A fair analysis of the conduct of Dowse and Duncan
must compel a conclusion that neither of them were
guilty of fraud or overreaching which would nullify the
sheriff's sale. One cannot be guilty of fraud by doing
what he has a legal right to do and courts will not inquire
into motives for doing a lawful act. (Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Bohlken, 40 Fed. Supp. 494 ;
Owens v. Owens, 347 Mo. 80, 146 S.W. (2d) 569; Yoder
v. Givens, 179 Va, 229, 18 S.E. (2d) 380). Therefore,
one must conclude that Finding 17 is without substantial
evidence to support it.
There is an absurd statement contained in this finding concerning which comment should be made. It is
declared that the execution and levy directed by Dowse
"was a part of a conspiracy on the part of the defendant
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S. W. Dowse to deprive plaintiff of his property.* * *"
There is no necessity of discussing the law of conspiracy
at length but it is most pertinent to remark that a man
cannot conspire with himself. There must be two or more
parties to a conspiracy. (15 CJ. Sec. 1, p. 996; Frost
v. Hanscome, 198 Cal. 500, 246 Pac. 53; Moropoulos v.
Fuller Company, 186 Cal. 679, 200 Pac. 601; Mclntire v.
Chevrolet Motor Company, 115 Cal. App. 187, 1 Pac.
(2d) 40; 11 Am. Jur. Conspiracy, Sec. 4, p. 544). There
is no finding that Dowse and Bleak, the deputy sheriff,
conspired together or that Dowse and Duncan conspired
together or that Duncan and Bleak conspired together.
As above stated the evidence exculpates Bleak from any
wrongdoing to which a charge of conspiracy could be
attached. As between Dowse and Duncan there is not a
line of evidence that indicates any concerted action to
accomplish an unlawful purpose or to accomplish some
purpose not in itself unlawful by unlawful means. Duncan is securing the issuance of the writ of execution,
delivering the praecipe to Bleak and making the bid
at the sale for Dowse acted only as every attorney must
act in like circumstances for his client who is a judgment
creditor. To find such conduct by Duncan as a participation in a conspiracy with his client Dowse is to find that
a lawyer is a conspirator in representing his client in
litigation. Such finding would destroy the legal profession. This part of Finding 17 is not only not supported by the evidence but is manifestly without merit.
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IV.
WHETHER A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR SLANDER
OR DISPARAGEMENT OF PROPERTY OR OF THE
TITLE THERETO WAS ALLEGED AND PROVED IN
THIS ACTION?
Finding 9 is as follows:
"9. That defendant S. W. Dowse, in causing
execution to be issued and in levying upon the
property of plaintiff and in causing the same
to be sold at Sheriff's sale, and in purchasing
the same at Sheriff's Sale acted maliciously in
said matter and by such actions said defendant
slandered the title of plaintiff to said property
herein described." (B. 241).
With respect to the elements of a cause of action
for slander of title or disparagement of property the
correct rule is stated as follows:
"The rule is generally recognized that special damage is a necessary element of a cause
of action for slander of title or disparagement
of goods or property, and that the special damages recoverable must be such as proximately
flow from the slander uttered. According to some
authorities, in order to show that the words uttered in slander of title have caused injury or special damage to the plaintiff, it is essential that
they were uttered pending some negotiation or
proceeding for the sale of the property, and that.
thereby some intending purchaser was prevented
from purchasing, bidding, or competing; and in
any case where the loss of sale of a thing disparaged is claimed and relied on as special damages occasioned by the disparagement, it is necessary to show a loss of sale to some particular
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person. * * *" (33 Am. Jur. Libel and Slander,
Sec. 350, p. 314 and 315).
The early case of Burkett v. Griffiths, 90 Cal. 532,
27 Pac. 527, 13 L.R.A. 707, laid down the rule that an
action for slander of title cannot be maintained for statements causing the breach by a third person of a valid
contract to purchase plaintiff's property. The court
said:
"In an action like the present, the plaintiff
can recover only such damage as he may have
sustained by reason of an intending purchaser
being prevented from making the contract; but
the complaint herein shows that whatever statements or declarations were made by the defendant
prior to the making of the contract did not have
the effect to provent Sketchley from entering
into the same, and those which he made thereafter have not caused the plaintiff any damage
which can be said to have resulted therefrom.
We know of no case in which it has been held
that, when the plaintiff has a valid contract of
sale, he can recover damages for its breach
against one whose words, however false and
malicious, have induced the other contracting
party to violate such agreement." (13 L.R.A.
710).
In Gudger v. Manton, 21 Cal. (2d) 537, 134 Pac.
(2d) 217, the California Supreme Court broadened the
narrow doctrine of the Burkett case, supra, in the following language:
"In Burkett v. Griffith, supra, the court was
not concerned with a recorded instrument affecting the title. Further, it seemed persuaded that
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where a binding contract exists between the purchaser and plaintiff, and the disparaging matter
induced the purchaser to breach his contract
rather than preventing him from agreeing to
purchase, the plaintiff had an adequate remedy
against the purchaser. That reasoning is no
longer valid inasmuch as an action will lie for
inducing the breach of a contract by a resort
to unlawful means such as libel or slander."
The doctrine of the Gudger case, supra, was followed in Baker v. Kale, 83 Cal App. (2d) 89, 189 Pac.
(2d) 57, wherein it was held that one publishing without a privilege to do so, publishes matter which is untrue
and disparaging to another's property in land, under
such circumstances as would lead a reasonable man to
foresee that the conduct of a third as purchaser or
lessee thereof might be determined by such publication
he is guilty of slander of title.
The Wyoming Supreme Court in Barquin v. Hall
Oil Company, 28 Wyo. 164, 201 Pac. 352, 202 Pac. 1107,
made the following pertinent statements:
"Hence the special damages must be specifically pointed out or the petition is demurrable.
It is not sufficient to allege in general terms that
the plaintiff has been damaged or that he has
been prevented from making a sale; if the property could have been sold for more than its value,
or for more than it actually brought, the amount
thereof must be stated and the parties must bo
named. It is clear, therefore, that on this issue
the pleadings of plaintiffs are not sufficient
against a demurrer." (201 Pac. 354).
"The facts showing how the special damages
claimed arose must be stated (17 C.J. 1003) in
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order to apprise the adverse party so as to put
him in position to properly meet the question by
opposite proof, if he has any. Hence, when plaintiff simply alleges that he has been damaged by
reason of the failure to release the instruments of
record without stating the facts upon which that
loss is based and the amount thereof, the pleading
is not merely indefinite, but in such case there
is a total want of sufficient allegations." (202 Pac.
1108).
In the instant case Issue of Fact 12 contained in the
Pretrial Order (E. 35) reads as follows: "Did S. W.
Dowse slander the title of the realty described in paragraph 1 of plaintiff's amended complaint by causing the
same to be sold at sheriff's sale and to be mortgaged
and sold to the other defendants in this action!"
Plaintiff's amended complaint contains no allegation
of special damages. There is no claim either (a) that
an intending purchaser from Pender was prevented from
making a contract to buy or from buying the land sold
at the sheriff's sale (Burhett case, supra) or (b) that
a third party purchaser of the land from Pender was
induced to breach his contract {Gudger case, supra).
Under the authorities a part of the cause of action are
the special damages accruing to a plaintiff because of
the defendant's malicious actions in disparaging the
land of the title thereof. He must allege and prove
either one or both elements (a) and (b) above which
are constituent parts of his cause of action. If they are
not alleged and proved no cause of action for slander
of title exists. Pender did not prove that Dowse had
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prevented a sale to a third person nor did he prove
that Dowse caused a third party purchaser to breach
a contract of purchase with Pender. Therefore, it appears beyond doubt that no cause of action for slander
of title by Dowse existed in Pender's favor. Finding 9
is not supported by the evidence and is an illegal, capricious and wholly arbitrary finding by the court. Under
all circumstances it should be annulled and set aside.
It is obvious that this error permeated the judgment
which allowed Pender $500.00 punitive damages and
$1,000.00 attorney's fees. The court was confused and
considered the allowance of punitive damages and attorney's fees as the damages supported by Pender for slander of title. Such award was clearly illegal because damages which are allowed a plaintiff for slander of title
are special damages of the nature above described,
V.
WHETHER ATTORNEY'S FEES IN AN ACTION
FOR SLANDER OF TITLE ARE ALLOWABLE?
The right to recover attorney's fees from one's
opponent in litigation as part of the costs thereof does
not exist at common law. Such item of expense is not
allowable in the absence of statute or of some agreement
expressly authorizing the taxing of attorney's fees in
addition to the ordinary statutory costs. The term
"costs" or "expenses" does not ordinarily include attorney's fees.
"In the absence of contract, statute or recognized ground of equity there is no inherent right
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to have attorneys' fees paid by the opposing side."
(Johnson v. Gerald, 216 Ala. 581, 113 So. 447,
59A.L.R. 348).
"With respect to the award of $200.00 for
attorney fees as damages for depriving plaintiff
of possession by writ of attachment, the judgment
was clearly erroneous. There was no contract
involved which authorized the award of counsel
fees and and there was no basis for an award of
punitive damages. See 15 Am. Jur. p. 551, 25
C.J.S., Damages, Sec. 50, p. 531, and Drinkhouse
v. Van Ness, 202 Cal. 359, 260 P. 869. Cf. St.
Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. Love, 57 Utah 450,
195 P. 305, 25 A.L.R. 569." (Dahl v. Prince,
Utah
; 230 Pac. (2d) 1328).
"Evidence was admitted, over the objection
of intervener, as to expenses incurred by plaintiffs in pursuit of and for locating the horse prior
to the commencement of the action, including
$500.00 for the services of an attorney in that
regard. Plaintiffs admit that the admission of
the testimony constituted error, but contend that
'the items were small, and apparently the jury
gave no consideration thereto.' * * * In this case
the amounts claimed to have been so spent were,
no doubt, definitely fixed in the minds of the
jurors and, in view of the court's instruction, we
may safely assume that they included the entire
amount of the $500.00 attorney's fees in their
award of damages. For that reason the judgment
against the defendant should be reduced by that
amount," (Drinkhouse v. Van Ness, 202 Cal.
359, 260 Pac. 869; See Beindorf v. Thorpe et al.,
126 Okla. 157, 259 Pac. 242, 55 A.L.E. 1014; 14
Am. Jur. Costs Sec. 63, p. 38; Ann. 150 AL.E.
720).
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In the Barquin v. Hall Oil Company, supra, the
Wyoming Supreme Court disallowed a claim for attorney's fees.
McGuinness v. Hargiss, 56 Wash. 162, 105 Pac. 233,
contains the following statement:
"Upon the second point submitted, we are of
the opinion that the court below erred. In actions
of slander of title it is the recognized rule that
only special damages are recoverable, and that
such damages must be pleaded and proved. 25
Am. & Eng. Enc. Law. 1079; 25 Cyc. 561. There
was no plea nor proof of special damage, except
the claim for an attorney's fee for the prosecution
of this action. We have uniformly held that in
this state attorney's fees, either as damages or
costs, other than statutory, are not recoverable.
In Spencer v. Commercial Company, 36 Wash.
374, 78 Pac. 914, the court attempts to forever
settle the question by saying: 'It has been so often
decided that the granting of attorney's fees in
cases of this kind was error that it is no longer
a proper subject for discussion.' "
There is no statute in Utah authorizing the recovery
of attorney's fees in a slander of title action. There was
certainly no agreement of the parties hereto for the
losing party to pay opponent's attorney's fees. The
authorities cited in point IV above demonstrate that
attorney's fees is not part of the special damages which
can be alleged and proved in a slander of title action.
The result is that the allowance of attorney's fees in
this action (Finding 27, (B, 246); Conclusion of Law 4
(B. 248); Judgment (E. 250) is invalid and without
justification of law.
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VI.
WHETHER PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE ALLOWABLE IN THIS ACTION?
Finding of Fact 26 (R. 246) reads as follows:
"26. That defendant Dowse in all of said
acts acted maliciously and with intent to vex and
harass plaintiff. That said defendant S. W.
Dowse knew that his not satisfying the judgment
as herein referred to and in executing on and
selling plaintiff's property would cast a cloud
upon and slander upon plaintiff's title to all land
owned or that might thereafter be owned by plaintiff, and the said defendant has been guilty of
oppression and malice. That this is a proper case
for punitive and exemplary damages. That the
sum of $500.00 is a reasonable sum to be awarded
plaintiff as punitive damages."
The Judgment (R. 248) awarded Pender $500.00
punitive and exemplary damages.
Issue of Fact 10 in the Pretrial Order (R. 35) read
as follows:
"Did S. W. Dowse act maliciously in directing the sheriff to sell the real property under the
execution herein and if he did what would be
the amount of punitive damages to assess against
S. W. Dowse in case Rennold Pender prevails in
this law suit!"
Allowance of punitive damages is discussed in the
following excerpts from decided cases:
"Exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages
are such damages as are in excess of the actual
loss, and are allowed where a tort is aggravated
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by evil motive, actual malice, deliberate violence,
oppression or fraud." (Murphy v. Booth, 36 Utah
285; 103 Pac. 768).
"The law does not, and in the nature of things
cannot, allow exemplary or punitive damages
for mere negligence, although gross, nor for mistakes that may affect the rights of others, unless
some act or acts indicative of bad motives or an
intention to oppress or wrongfully vex and harass
another is made manifest. Actual and compensatory damages is the rule, and exemplary or
punitive damages the exception." (Rugg v. Tolman, 39 Utah 295,117 Pac. 54).
"Whether there is evidence justifying exemplary damages is a question of law for the court,
and, where there is no evidence, it is error to submit the issue to the jury." (Tripp v. Bagley, 75
Utah 42, 282 Pac. 1026; Cf. Haycraft v. Adams,
82 Utah 347, 24 Pac, (2d) 1110).
"In the second place, what is known as malice
in fact, as distinguished from malice in law, must
exist before punitive or exemplary damages can
be given. Appellants quote the definition of
malice as 'legal malice, or the malice aforethought
of the statute, denotes a wrongful act done intentionally, and without legal cause or excuse.' People v. Taylor, 36 Cal. 255. In other words, appellants contend that malice in a legal sense simply
means a wrongful act done intentionally, without
just cause or excuse. This is true so far as supporting an award of compensatory damages Ls
concerned, but malice in fact goes to the state of
mind and evil motive of defendant, and the burden
to proving the existence of that state of mind
is in every case upon the plaintiff who seeks an
award of punitive damages based upon its exist 68
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ence, and whether this state of mind existed is
always a question for the court or jury to determine. Taylor v. Hearst, 107 Cal. 262, 40 P. 392;
Trabing v. California Navigation Co., 121 Cal.
137, 53 P. 644; Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143, 116
P. 530." {Boss v. Sweeters, 119 Cal. App. 716, 7
Pac. (2d) 234).
In order to sustain this allowance of exemplary
damages there must be preponderating evidence that
Dowse acted maliciously and vindictively in causing the
writ of execution to issue and the sale to be held thereunder. This malice must be malice in fact and not malice
in law. There must be evidence to show that Dowse
was motivated by a malicious desire to injure Pender
and not simply to vindicate his (Dowse's) rights. The
Murphy case, supra, illustrates graphically what is meant
by malice in fact. Booth used criminal processes in
attempting to collect a debt pretending that Mrs. Murphy
had fraudulently contracted the obligation. It was manifest from Booth's actions and expressions that he sought
to punish and humiliate Mrs. Murphy so as to compel
her to pay a debt which she denied existed. The Rugg
case, supra, illustrates that mere negligence or mistake
although gross is not sufficient to support punitive damages unless there is evidence of bad motives or intention
to oppress or wrongfully vex or harass another without
legal justification.
The record in the instant case must therefore be
searched to discover malice in fact on the part of Dowse
in order to support exemplary damages. It is confidently
asserted that the evidence herein is totally lacking in
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proof of such fact. Dowse held a money judgment against
Pender. He pursued his legal remedy by causing writ
of execution to issue on said judgment. There is no
requirement of law that prohibited Dowse from adopting this legal process to collect the judgment owing
him. It was authorized by law. He had paid Pender
$100.00 in order to secure Pender's waiver of time to
appeal. Neither Pender himself nor his attorney Backman as a condition for waiving the time of appeal
exacted from Dowse a satisfaction of the judgment.
The record shows that the judgment was ignored by
Pender in requiring Dowse to pay for the appeal waiver.
With this status of the transaction Dowse simply pursued a remedy granted him by law. There is no evidence
that he threatened Pender or expressed the desire of
punishing him. There is not a line of evidence to indicate that Dowse entertained personal animus against
Pender. Under these circumstances there is a total
absence of malice in fact in Dowse's actions. Finding
of Fact 26 and the provisions of the judgment based
on the same should be nullified.
STABILITY OF LAND TITLES DERIVED THROUGH
JUDICIAL PROCESS
The stability and marketability of real property
titles is a matter of grave concern to the courts. Any
rule which would permit a judgment debtor to upset a
sheriff's sale after the period of redemption has expired
and the sheriff's deed issued to the purchaser by instituting an independent action collaterally attacking the sale
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and asking for cancellation of the deed on the grounds
herein asserted would be highly destructive of land titles
derived through judicial process. It is manifest from a
study of the decisions of the courts of the several states
that they are well aware of the chaotic condition as to
real property titles which would result as a consequence
of permitting a dissatisfied judgment debtor successfully
to impeach and nullify sheriff's sales on the grounds
here urged. Public policy very definitely dictates that
the integrity of such sales be upheld and that irregularities of the nature here discussed be disallowed in a collateral action as grounds for nullifying such sale and
the conveyance issued pursuant thereto. A judgment
debtor is not denied relief by this rule. In Utah he may
directly question the validity of the sale by a motion filed
at any time during the period of redemption. Title to
the real property does not pass upon the sale or by the
issuance of the certificate of sale but only by the sheriff's
deed at the expiration of the period of redemption.
(Local Realty Company v. Lmdquist, et ux, 96 Utah
297, 85 Pac. (2d) 770). During the period of redemption
the purchaser at the sale or anyone dealing with the
property is on notice that the sale is not final and that
during such period the judgment debtor may question
the regularity of the sale in all particulars. There is,
therefore, no hardship visited upon a judgment debtor.
It certainly does not lie in his mouth to say that he did
not know there was a judgment against him and further
he is charged with the knowledge that an execution may
issue on such judgment to satisfy the same. It is his
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responsibility to keep himself informed as to the issuance of a writ of execution and any sale held thereunder.
When he stands by during the whole period of redemption and fails to question the procedure on sale and
allows the sheriff's deed to issue he has certainly waived
all objections to those irregularities which produce voidable conditions only. He should be absolutely forbidden
to attack the processes of sale on the grounds here urged
after he has waited until after the sheriff's deed has
issued to the purchaser. Any other rule would render
titles on judicial sales infirm and rather shadowy affairs.
The purchaser or mortgagee dealing with such titles
would be charged at his peril to ascertain facts which
might and usually would be difficult, if not impossible
of discovery. The economic and social well-being of the
state dictates that the titles produced by such sales
should be sustained against such attacks.
WHEREFORE, Dowse prays that the judgment in
this action be reversed and set aside and the trial court
be directed to enter judgment against Pender with costs
in favor of Dowse.
Respectfully submitted,
DUNCAN
FRANKLIN RITER
Attorneys for Defendant
and Appellant

LAMAR

S.W. DOWSE
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